"Putting on the Game Face" |
In reading Gate's book I'm struck by much of the analytical thought. In the course of my service life I had an opportunity to write documents that were essentially “Staff Studies.” At different stages in the book Gates presents to President Bush and Obama “Talking Points” that support the recommendations he makes. In some cases these are facts bearing on the problem, in others assumptions and in still others conclusions and recommendations. These Talking Points, arranged (as he recalls), are powerful and convincing. It appears that each in themselves is not classified but they were lifted from documents that certainly were. This raises the question how much influence Secretary Gates had in writing the documents. Were they penned by his hand or did a staffer write them based upon the boss’s intent? Actually it doesn't really matter. In the end all that matters is that they were used effectively. As Hesiod once pointed out, (Allow me to paraphrase) a tier-one intellect discovers "Best" and a tier-two knows it when they see it. In the American Military there is a process whereby there is first an analytical phase followed by an action phase. In the Army the analytical phase is referred to as the Commander’s Estimate of the Situation and the action phase as the Operation’s Order. In the Commander’s estimate an adapted form of the problem solving process is used. It consists of defining the problem, identifying relevant facts and assumptions, formulating courses of action, analyzing and comparing these, reaching a conclusion and making a recommendation. Critics often attack an analysis beginning with the assumptions when they would be better severed by taking a good look at the problem statement. In preparing for the action phase the Operations Order is written based upon what the Commander decided from the Estimate. What we see in Gate’s book, as he pleads his cases with the two Presidents, are excerpts from these two processes. Please bear with me as I explain for those who are not familiar. To set the ball rolling the Commander (Director) issues his planning guidance before those around him go to work on the documents. This guidance should define the problem and usually begins with the boilerplate “We need to determine the best way to….” He might provide some facts and assumptions to begin with. Ideally he leaves the identification of options open so as not to steer or constrain the outcome. Historically these processes have proceeded along three paths. First the commander is mentally game playing in his own mind. Secondly he might choose one or two subordinate commanders to pursue an independent assessment. Finally it goes to the commander’s staff for a third input in the decision process. A critical aspect is the first step, defining the problem. If the commander fails to define the problem then there are certain to be serious issues down the road. I used to provide a vignette to student staff officers of a situation and then ask them to define the problem. It never failed that I got different answers from most everybody who often defined the problem in terms of facts, assumptions, courses of action and various other off the wall considerations. For example Secretary Gates might have told his staff “We need to determine the best way to bring the war in Afghanistan to a viable conclusion.” President Bush might have defined it, as “We need to determine the best way to win the war and leave behind a democratic government.” President Obama might have defined it, as “We need to determine the best way to get our troops out before the midterm elections.” Vice President Biden might have defined it, as “We need to determine the best way to get our troops out as soon as possible.” I hope my readers are beginning to see how important defining the problem is. In Gate's Book I don’t see much of a common definition among the players and must infer from actions the way they saw the problem. |