"Putting on the Game Face" |
Snipers are an ugly aspect of war however they are by no means the only troubling aspect. War is a state sanctioned license to kill at a level that is mind boggling and almost unimaginable. In WW2 there were aces in aviation who shot down over 200 aircraft, there were German tank aces who destroyed over 100 enemy tanks and at Stalingrad there were Soviet snipers who recorded kills that exceeded the one hundred mark. No enemy should ever be allowed to achieve that level of skill and proficiency. Long before this happens threat individuals with this level of skill and experience should be identified and eliminated. As long as American soldiers are expected to fight on equal terms, snipers are a cost effective way for our enemies to inflict casualties and attrit our combat forces. In Vietnam, as a rifle platoon leader, I had VC and NVA shooting at me on a regular basis. Fortunately they were no better aims than most of us were. As a result, attrition by rifle or machine gun fire was not the statistic we feared most. IEDs were the most effective means the enemy had for causing casualties. Surprisingly little seems to have changed, however, snipers have a great potential for reversing that statistic. We know that US snipers have been very effective in the middle east wars. Still, when I see footage of US operations in Iraq and Afganistan, what I see looks a like the old search and clear operations we used to run in Vietnam... operations where we were walking around with targets on our chests looking for an invisible enemy, trying to avoid stepping on a booby trap. Consider how our forces would fare if we found ourselves in urban warfare facing an enemy like the Soviets. In that scenario thousands of German soldiers were killed by snipers and while the Germans never quite figured out how to counter the dilemma, the results showed how serious the threat can be given a well trained and determined enemy. It seems to me that the techniques for countering a sniper threat deserve more attention. Wether in an urban or a rural environment the principles seem the same... locate, engage and verify. Armies throughout the world who train snipers emphasize the following... conceal your location, do not remain too long in one spot after taking a shot and have backup. The Russians at Stalingrad had an ideal location for sniping. Most of the large industrial factories had been razed by bombing and artillery fire and these blown out buildings and concrete rubble offered good cover, concealment and protection. Shots at ranges of under 500 yards were commonplace. At these ranges a trained sniper seldom misses. The Germans reacted by taking cover. Mortar and artillery fire, while not used very effectively, was a common response and engendered the most fear in the Soviets. One Russian sniper was so effective the Germans were said to be considering "exceptional measures" to end his streak. When the Russians got word they suspected it would be the use of armored vehicles and took measures accordingly. Exactly how that played out I'm not aware. It is well known that commanders are loath to fight in urban areas. However, if such is ever the case there needs to be a better idea of how to eliminate the sniper threat. The US Army has already made some progress. For a long time armies have been aware of the technology referred to as Counter Batter Fire. In this scenario a radar picks up the trajectory of an incoming artillery round and thereby knows the precise point from which it was fired. This technology has been expanded into small arms fire. Sound technology as well as lasers are also being developed. It is more the integration means than the detection technology that has the most potential for improvement. While we have a remedial capability, it is not in an optimal state of development, nor is it integrated well enough into the counter fire capabilities of small units to be responsive. What is required is a "hands off "almost instantaneous integration with a company level, mortar fire direction center. A sniper is not going to hang around while we figure out where he/she is, manually coordinate responsive fires and decide if the action is worth the political consequences. For example, a shot is fired at US forces in an Urban area. The location from where the shot came is fed electronically to the mortars. In less than five seconds a half a dozen rounds are being fired at and around the enemy location. While there could be rules of engagement issues on blind fires, the munitions could be fuzed as to not penetrate into buildings where civilians might be taking refuge. Integrating a drone with a surveillance camera would show the effectiveness of the fire and a better look at the target. If warranted, heavier artillery could be followed up. This is a capability the Germans lacked at Stalingrad and one that the Army should be getting more involved in. We continue to learn little from the past and just because DARPA comes up with a new capability that is not assurance it will be implemented and used effectively. We can't seen to even apply the lessons from the past, much less really appreciate what new technology has to offer. |