Nikola Pasic: Incompetence or Complicity

Nikola Pasic:

Incompetence or Complicity

By the end of the day June 28, 1914 Europe was about to change forever. A 19 year old Bosnian university student had assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sofie while they were touring Sarajevo. The assassin's name was Gavrilo Princip and he was apprehended immediately by surrounding citizens and subsequently taken to jail. By 11am both the Archduke and his wife were dead and the process of political cover was about to begin.

The accounts of the events that took place after the assassination have been recounted time after time for over a century. Additionally, the parts played by Nikola Pasic, Serbian Prime Minister, as well as Dragutin "Apis" Dimitrijevic, Serbian Chief of Military Intelligence, have been documented at length for a matching amount of time. All the accounts of these facts surrounding the events leading up to the assassination claim the same story; the Black Hand, led by Dimitrijevic, head of the military intelligence, provided guns and explosives to Princip and his co-conspirators. Pasic, knowing about Dimitrijevic's part in the Black Hand, attempts to hide this fact in order to avoid a conflict with Austria-Hungary. This attempt to avert conflict failed with the delivery of a 48 hour ultimatum delivered by Austria. While this account is, in general, correct I believe it is superficial and that Nikola Pasic played a vastly more important role in the events up to and including complicity in the assassination. To fully examine the events of the summer of 1914 you must first understand who the primary characters are. Not simply their jobs of political opinions, but who they were as men. The two principle individuals that were imperative to this argument are Nikola Pasic and his longtime adversary, Dragutin "Apis" Dimitrijevic.

Dragutin Dimitrijevic, nicknamed "Apis", was, in 1914, the Chief of Serbian Military Intelligence and, ironically the head of the Black Hand. A secret military organization which commonly employed terroristic methods in its effort to achieve Serbian Liberation. Personally Apis was known to be ruthless, conceited and secretive. He preferred to work in secret yet made sure that people knew that he was working on secret projects. His controlling nature pushed a subconscious need to have all the threads of an operation in the palm of his hand and completely under his control.¹ Furthermore, his ruthlessness took center stage as an active participant in the 1903 coup and bloody assassination of King Alexander Obrenovic and his wife.²

Apis' life of violent nationalism began in 1903 with the military coup which resulted in the murder of King Alexander Obrenovic and his wife.³ Over the next eight years, partially due to the actions of Pasic, Apis became a prominent figure within the Serbian Military. Eventually, in 1911 Apis, along with several other members of the military, as well as the 1903 assassination, created what came to be known as the Black Hand. Members of the Black Hand, especially Apis, supported the ideology of a strong military as well as a centralized government which is the antithesis to the democratic beliefs of Nikola Pasic.⁴ With the formation of the Black Hand Apis finally had the threads in hand that provided the control he needed.

Opposite Apis was the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pasic. Pasic's strength was in his political experience and know-how, a culmination of over 40 years of political experience.⁵ While Pasic was absolutely committed to Serbian independence and democracy his policy and foreign relations decisions were closely connected to those of Russia after having served as Serbian envoy to Russia for several years. With his vast amount of experience Pasic was known to be very secretive and cautious. According to people close to him he rarely wrote down his ideas, preferring to keep them locked away in his own mind.⁶ Even those ideas he did write down he often burned to keep them out of the wrong hands. His sense of political self-preservation was very keen evident by his actions during the military coup of 1903.

Pasic began his career in politics as an important member of the Radical Party during the 1800's. His prominence in the party would, at times, prove to be dangerous, even life threatening. Yet, it was also these experiences that made him an accomplished and resilient politician. This resiliency carried Pasic through six years of exile in Russia following the Timok rebellion. During this period of time Pasic was able to build numerous political connections which would prove to be highly beneficial when it came to his response to events in 1914. His exile would not be his only chance to make connections with the Russian government. During the 1890's Pasic was appointed to the position of Serbian Envoy to Russia where he came to the realization that the independence he desired for Serbia could not be realized without help from Russia.⁷

By 1903 the political career of Nikola Pasic had come full circle. Receiving notification of the planned coup that took the life of King Alexander Obrenovic and the queen, Pasic sat back and waited. He neither participated in nor warned anyone of the upcoming coup. What he did was a matter of clam cool political sleight of hand. Packing his family he took them immediately on vacation and waited for events to unfold. Again, falling back on his political experience, following the coup, Pasic publicly supported the coup and the military officers involved in and carried out the plan thus gaining their support as well. Ironically, Pasic later worked to have these same men removed from public life where they could do less political harm. This move in turn, created an opening that was filled by none other than Apis.

Both men, Pasic and Apis, were Serbian Nationalists and pro Pan-Slavic. Both believed in the ends justifying the means. However, they differed greatly in the means that they chose to employ. Apis was interested in independence through force, while Pasic was more interested in a diplomatic solution.⁸ This obviously caused a bitter rivalry between the two men, rising to a level at which the Black Hand had sentenced Pasic and Stojan Protic to death.⁹

Approximately a month prior to the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, Nikola Pasic received word from an informant, Milan Ciganovic, member of the Black Hand and Pasic's direct access to the organization, about the assassination plot.¹⁰ The approximate date on which the information was sent by Ciganovic was June 4^th with Pasic receiving the information on June 6^th.¹¹ This particular time frame is reinforced in a 1924 personal memoir written by Ljuba Jovanovic in which he claimed that Pasic had notified his cabinet, at the end of May or beginning of June, that there was a plot in motion and people were going to Sarajevo to kill the Archduke.¹² The fact that Pasic had this information and that it was received by an actual member of the Black Hand strongly adds to the fact that Pasic was not a kindly old man looking to do what was right for the country, he was a highly skilled diplomat that knew how to get people to do what was needed and provide him with the resources he needed. Additionally, Jovanovic explains that they advised Pasic that he should send orders to the border agents to stop any arms smuggling or illegal border crossings. This account is further corroborated via telegram from Protic to Pasic claiming that orders had been sent to the border agents, but those same agents were given contradicting orders allowing the arms to cross the border into Serbia.¹³

The fact that the Black Hand was, for the most part, in control of the military, including the fact that many were part of the organization, was well known to most of the civilian politicians including Pasic. The letter from Protic only reinforces this in the fact that he implicates Rade Malobabic, an agent for military intelligence, and states that after interviewing the border agents' claims that the contradicting orders they had received were not written by himself or by Pasic, but by "someone else". The fact that Malobabic is military intelligence and a member of the Black Hand further implicated Apis. When questioned about the orders and the guns Apis, rather than denying he had written the orders, claims that the guns were needed by intelligence couriers so that they might defend themselves.¹⁴ These claims of self-defense, by Apis, came to Pasic and members of the civil government on June 21, seven days later Archduke Franz Ferdinand was dead and Europe was on the road to war.

Now that the assassination of the Archduke had come to pass, various questions begin to present themselves. If Pasic knew about the assassination plot why didn't he do more to stop it from being carried out? If he knew that most of the military was part of or at least influenced by the Black Hand, why not utilize a different avenue in dealing with the smuggling? He was after all the most powerful man, politically, in the country. Did he actually want the Archduke dead, after all he did lean more towards diplomatic solutions rather than that of violence, or is it possible that he simply wanted to scare Franz Ferdinand? At one point Apis was even noted as simply wanting to scare the Archduke rather than kill him¹⁵ and Pasic had received his information from Ciganovic, a member of the Black Hand, meaning Pasic had the logistical information that he needed to make the plot work for him rather than against him. If the plan were to fail (even Apis wasn't sure that the plan would work) and Franz Ferdinand lived Pasic would look like a hero and be able to dismantle the Black Hand, as well as destroy Apis, with the information he possessed. Franz Ferdinand would be in his debt and Serbia would be that much closer to independence via good will and diplomacy. This would also explain Pasic's delay in dealing with the smuggling and border agents.

However, since the plan succeeded, Pasic now needed to employ every bit of experience he had to avoid a conflict that Serbia would more than likely lose. After numerous years as a Serbian diplomat in Saint Petersburg, Pasic still had many of his connections which may have reinforced the decisions he made in the weeks leading up to June 28^th. His belief that his decisions and Serbia would be backed by Russia was confirmed through several telegrams dated July 24^th and 25^th, 1914. Sent to Pasic by Milorad Spalajkovic, Serbian ambassador to Russia, Spalajkovic explains that Russia, specifically Minister Sazonov, condemned the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and that a nation that complies with the demands put forth by Austria would cease to exist as a sovereign nation. Subsequently, Minister Sazonov stated that Serbia would be able to count on Russian assistance against Austria, but was not able to be specific concerning the type of assistance that would be offered. Sazonov did, however, advise Pasic that Serbia should publically and internationally condemn the murder of Franz Ferdinand, deny all accusations directed at Serbia and vow to bring all those responsible for the crime to justice.¹⁶

Ironically, Pasic had done just that the day before in regards to Serbian foreign offices to whom he sent a telegram. Within the telegram Pasic condemned the murder and denies any Serbian culpability in the crime. He further blamed the hostility that was currently happening on the Austrian government and press as encouragement to engage in a conflict.¹⁷ The Russian response is exactly what Pasic must have been counting on further strengthening his resolve to hide the truth that he had allowed the assassination to happen. To further reinforce Sazonov's response and encourage Pasic, he received a telegram from Spalajkovic advising him that Tsar Nicolas had ordered mobilization of Russian troops as well as the commissioning of all military cadets to officers.¹⁸

When it comes to the question about whether or not Nikola Pasic would actually go as far as placing another man's life on the line for his or Serbia's political gain one must examine his ideas of patriotism for Serbia as well as his devotion to Pan-Slavism and the absolute aggression he harbored for Austria-Hungary. Spending forty years in politics as a prominent and powerful member of the Serbian Radical Party, spending years in exile for his political views as well as facing a possible death sentence from the Black Hand, the very organization responsible for the assassination that he apparently allowed through personal inaction, Would Pasic be willing, for political gain, to sit back calmly and allow a man and his wife to be murdered? As we have seen during the military coup of 1903, when he took his family on a vacation after receiving word of the coup, he is absolutely capable of sending a man to his death.

In a confidential letter dated July 22, 1914, Russian chargd'affaires Bronevski related an incident, which speaks directly to Pasic's political outlook at the time, to Minister Sazonov which occurred at the funeral of Russian Minister Nikola Hartwig. According to Bronevski, Pasic was giving a speech during the services in which he publically showered praise on and glorified Pan-Slavism. In addition Pasic had apparently mad numerous hostile comments towards Austria-Hungary, surprising several people.¹⁹

When all was said and done only one obstacle stood in the way of Pasic obscuring his and Serbia's involvement, Dragutin "Apis" Dimitrijevic. In 1916 Pasic had Apis and Rade Malobabic arrested on trumped up charges of treason. The evidence that was available would not have held up in court, but in 1917 Apis and Malobabic were sentenced to death based on Apis' own reports.²⁰ Gavrilo Princip took care of himself, later dying in Terez Prison Camp of tuberculosis in 1918 which, ironically, became a concentration camp during World War II.

After forty years Nikola Pasic, by all accounts, was a highly skilled and experienced diplomat. He was adept in dealing with people, obvious by his length of time in politics, yet cunning and ruthless when the need arose. In 1903 he stood by while the King of Serbia was assassinated, by those who would become the Black Hand, even though he had advanced warning of the plot and took his family on a vacation while it happened. He supported those men who carried out the 1903 murder while it was politically expedient and subsequently made them disappear when the circumstances warranted it. Eleven years later when Pasic was presented with details of an assassination plot, by a member of the Black Hand, he chose to take actions that were inept and insufficient. Waiting to send orders to stop the smuggling of arms to border agents that were knowingly controlled by the Black Hand followed by an investigation during which documentation of the investigation disappeared. Again, Pasic stood by as another man was assassinated in the name of Serbia and proceeded to deny all knowledge and culpability. The decisions made by Pasic, a diplomat of forty years, were not those of an incompetent man, but those of someone skilled and highly calculating.

Primary Source Documents

Stanojevic, Stanoje. Description of Apis, 1923. In July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Documentary History, edited by Samuel R Williamson. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 2015.

Jovanovic, Ljuba. On Belgrade's Knowledge of the Conspiracy, 1924. In July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Documentary History, edited by Samuel R Williamson. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 2015.

Protic, Stojan. Letter to Nikola Pasic, June 15, 1914. In July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Documentary History, edited by Samuel R Williamson. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 2015.

Dimitrijevic, Dragutin. Reply to the Army Commander, June 21, 1914. In July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Documentary History, edited by Samuel R Williamson. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 2015.

Pasic, Nikola. Telegram to All Serbian Missions Abroad Except Vienna, July 18-19, 1914. In July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Documentary History, edited by Samuel R Williamson. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 2015.

Spalajkovic, Miroslav. Telegrams to Belgrade, July 24-25, 1914. In July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Documentary History, edited by Samuel R Williamson. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 2015.

Bronevski, Nikola. Charge d'Affaires Bronevski to Sazonov, July 22, 1914. In July 1914 : the Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents, edited by Imanuel Geiss. New York: Scribner, 1969.

Szapy, Frigyes. Szapy to Berchtold, July 24, 1914. In July 1914 : the Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents, edited by Imanuel Geiss. New York: Scribner, 1969.

Strandtmann, Basil. Charge d'Affaires Strandtmann to Sazonov, July 24, 1914. In July 1914 : the Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents, edited by Imanuel Geiss. New York: Scribner, 1969.

Dumaine. Dumaine to Bienvenu-Martin, July 24, 1914. In July 1914 : the Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents, edited by Imanuel Geiss. New York: Scribner, 1969.

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1 Description of Apis, 1923. In July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Documentary History, edited by Samuel R Williamson. (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 2015), 20.

2 Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 2013), 12-13.

3 Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 17.

4 Dusan T. Batakovic "Storm over Serbia: Rivalry Between Civilian and Military Authorities (1911-1914)." Balcanica. XLIV (2013): 326.

5 Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 16.

6 Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 19.

7 Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 17.

8 Batakovic, "Storm over Serbia," 310.

9 David MacKenzie."Stojan Protic's Final Decade and Serbia's Radical Party, 1913-1923." East European Quarterly 42, no. 3, (Fall 2008): 224.

10 Clark, The Sleepwalkers, 56.

11 Letter to Nikola Pasic, June 15, 1914. In July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Documentary History, edited by Samuel R Williamson. (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 2015),27

12 On Belgrade's Knowledge of the Conspiracy, 1924. In July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Documentary History, edited by Samuel R Williamson. (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 2015), 26

13 Letter to Nikola Pasic, June 15, 1914. In July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Documentary History, edited by Samuel R Williamson. (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 2015), 27-28; Gale Stokes. "The Serbian Documents from 1914: A Preview." The Journal of Modern History 48, no. 3 (1976): 78-79.

14 Reply to the Army Commander, June 21, 1914. In July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Documentary History, edited by Samuel R Williamson. (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 2015), 28.

15 Batakovic, "Storm over Serbia," 349.

16 Gale Stokes. "The Serbian Documents from 1914: A Preview." The Journal of Modern History 48, no. 3 (1976): 78-79; Telegrams to Belgrade, July 24-25, 1914. In July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Documentary History, edited by Samuel R Williamson. (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 2015), 37; Zoran Bajin. "Miroslav Spalajkovi?, the Serbian Minister in Russia in the July Crisis of 1914." Balcanica. XLVII (2016): 233-234.

17 Telegram to All Serbian Missions Abroad Except Vienna, July 18-19, 1914. In July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Documentary History, edited by Samuel R Williamson. (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press Inc., 2015), 34.

18 Gale Stokes. "The Serbian Documents from 1914: A Preview." The Journal of Modern History 48, no. 3 (1976): 71.

19 Imanuel Geiss. July 1914 : the Outbreak of the First World War, Selected Documents (New York: Scribner, 1969), 156-158.

20 Russel Van Wyk and Samuel R Williamson. July 1914: Soldiers, Statesmen, and the Coming of the Great War: A Documentary History. Long Grove, IL: (Waveland Press Inc., 2015),41; Batakovic, "Storm over Serbia," 350; David MacKenzie ."Stojan Protic's Final Decade and Serbia's Radical Party, 1913-1923." East European Quarterly 42, no. 3, (Fall 2008): 227-228.