Emotions at Work

In the academic literature on organisation theory, the seminal work on emotion (Fineman, 2000) produced a series of counter-intuitive findings. Emotion, while linked to expectations, is not associated with our individual goals and aspirations. Instead, it was found to link more strongly to our status within various social groups. In gathering stories about emotion at work, researchers found that people talk less about themselves and their goals than their relationships with others (Sandelands and Boudens, 2000). The impact of this perspective can be illustrated by considering modern treatments for drug addicts that involve the addict's family and friends. In these treatments, the family and friends of the addict are counselled, rather than the addict. By challenging the way family members and friends see (and blame) the addict, they start to change the way they behave. As the group members' behaviour changes, so does that of the addict, aiding their recovery.

Blame, therefore, is a complex phenomenon. It may be more than an emotional defence mechanism. It lowers the social standing of an opponent amongst a population of people (Ridley-Duff, 2005). It can be seen as an attempt to raise the social status of the accuser within the same group. Blame is a way of showing differences between oneself and another: it is an offensive, rather than defensive, strategy to win support through rhetorical expressions of emotions (such as confidence, sadness, distress or anger).

In may be, therefore, an employee's exclusion is the end result of a process by which some people seek to prove themselves as capable of being "tough" or take "hard decisions" (as proof of their commitment to "upholding the culture"). Resistance can also be seen in this light, as an outcome of someone seeking to prove to others that they will not be "pushed around" or "intimidated" by managers.

Emotion and Perception

The impact of emotions on accurate perception has been studied extensively. There are a wide range of social situations that influence what we report to others, and it has been found repeatedly that what we report is not always accurate. Whether these inaccuracies are due to a failure of perception, however, is not completely clear. In many cases, people report inaccuracies for social reasons: their perception is fine, but they still fail to tell the truth.

Two famous studies, the Milgram shock experiments (Milgram, 1963) and the Asch line experiments (Asch, 1955) shook the scientific world when they revealed the extent to which people conform to social pressure. In the Milgram experiments it was found that research participants were prepared - in extraordinary numbers - to follow a researcher's instruction to apply severe electric shocks to confederates who made mistakes during tests. In the Asch tests, participants were shown pairs of lines and asked to say whether they were the same or of a different length. Many participants were reluctant to follow their own judgement when faced with a group of confederates who disagreed with them. These experiments were influential in establishing the subject of social psychology and triggered thousands of studies into group behaviour in the 1970s/1980s. They are discussed in virtually every psychology and social psychology text book (as well as many other popular books).

There are two aspects of the experiments, however, that need clarification. Firstly, the impression given by some commentators (Sutherland, 1992) is that everyone conforms to social influence. This was far from true - some discussions give details of the emotional impact of truth telling and how participants who told the truth were particularly stressed (but did so anyway). The experiments are usually discussed from the perspective of what makes us lie, rather than the perspective of what makes us tell the truth. What is clear from descriptions of the experiments is that truth telling - when contradicting other people - is a highly emotional experience and this provides insights into why people lie (or stay silent). If, in their own opinion, the lie told will have little impact on their own or others' status, it is easier to justify. Those who conformed did so, in all likelihood, because they evaluated that the falsehood was not important. Alternatively, they lied to reduce the emotion they would feel from truth telling.

The other aspect that is ignored derives from a weakness in the design of the experiments. In choosing participants randomly, and confederates who do not know the participants, the participants and confederates have no (or few) emotional bonds. This is quite different from normal life where we do have emotional bonds with those whom we live and work. What results would the Milgram experiments have obtained if people were shocking their work colleagues, or friends, or family members? Would the participants have fewer inhibitions disagreeing about the length of the lines amongst friends and family? The experiments, therefore, only provide 'knowledge' about how we behave towards people we do not care about - not a particularly good basis from which to generalise about human behaviour as we spend most of our time with people with know.

The conclusion drawn from these and similar experiments is that our perception is unreliable when in the grip of emotion (Sutherland, 1992; Aronson, 2003). What is more accurate to assert, however, is that we are more selective about the truths we tell depending on our assessment of a situation (i.e. the meaning it has for us) and our assessment of the potential harm that may result from truth telling. Our perception may be accurate, but we alter what we say in the light of the situation (see Goffman, 1969).

When truth telling involves contradicting others we may alter what we say to reduce the emotion we feel. From Fineman's (or Goffman's) perspective, these alterations are choices that manage others' impression of us and control our status within the group. Our choice depends on a quick assessment of how important it is to tell the truth and what self-image we want to project. Cognitive psychologists, however, might argue that there is an error in our perception (see Sutherland, 1992).

Emotion and Sense-Making

Weick (1995) points out two other problems with emotion during investigations and decision-making. Firstly, if we cannot find a plausible explanation that maintains a good self-image, we progressively substitute less plausible explanations until we find one that maintains a positive self-image. This might result in adopting a prejudiced attitude to justify hurting someone else. This is particularly common in war situations when the enemy is demonised to justify bombing them (or business situations to justify behaviour during redundancy programmes or company takeovers). It is, in my experience, also common in the workplace to justify the termination of contracts.

The second problem is that our emotional memories may lead us to compare a current situation with a past situation that had a similar emotional impact, but is quite different in other respects. If we recall dissimilar situations to make sense of the current situation - simply because the emotional memories are similar - we may misinterpret the current situation. Poor judgement is the result.

A third problem that I identified in my own research (Ridley-Duff, 2005) - one that can also be a benefit - is that emotion causes us to focus attention. In some situations, solving a mystery perhaps, emotion drives us towards an explanation that is otherwise difficult to find. The desire to understand can be positive (if a hunch is correct) or negative (if the hunch is incorrect).

Consider Helen Mirren in her groundbreaking role as Inspector Tennyson in the "Prime Suspect" TV dramas (Plante, 1991). Her desire to establish herself in her career, combined with a powerful desire to convict (not just arrest) a brutal killer, sustained her through weeks of a difficult investigation. It cost her a great deal in personal relationship terms (her boyfriend left her) but her emotional commitment to "nailing" George Marlow helped to establish with precision the exact modus operandi of a highly intelligent killer. As a result she was able to account for all the available evidence and break his alibi.

We might contrast this fictional case with the real-life case of Sion Jenkins (BBC, 2006). In this case, the accused was found to have lied on his CV and the investigators took this as an indication that he might be lying over the death of his daughter. Their suspicions seemed to be confirmed - despite a wealth of evidence that suggested he may not be guilty - when microscopic drops of blood and bone were found on his jacket. This evidence was later found to be unreliable and the conviction was quashed. After two retrials, in which the jury could not agree on guilt/innocence, Jenkins was found 'not guilty' (on the instruction of the judge). In this case, the police had to contemplate that their hunch - triggered by the emotive reaction to the death of a young girl - led to a miscarriage of justice.

The stronger our emotions, the more we have a propensity to narrow down the focus of enquiry to end the emotional turmoil created by contradictions. The fictional Prime Suspect case had few contradictions (only the suspect's evidence supported by his spouse contradicted other evidence). The real life case involving Sion Jenkins had an extraordinary number of contradictions, so the investigators elevated the status of small pieces of evidence (microscopic drops of blood) to reassure themselves that their case was strong.

If the focus is narrowed incorrectly, a miscarriage of justice can occur. It was this process - reliance on a single piece of flawed scientific evidence - that occurred in the Guildford Four trial (Conlon, 1994). The bias in 'science' lies not in the process or the accuracy of the observation, but in the purposes of those observations and the way they are interpreted and reported. When focus is directed onto an innocent party who 'looks guilty', inconsistencies get ignored and the truth may be lost.

Glass (2002), who has produced two doctorates on human communication, argues that most people ignore vast amounts of information in order to hold onto a particular way of thinking. Why? Changing our thinking is deeply emotional, even painful. Ignoring information allows us to avoid pain. Emotional maturity, on the other hand, can be defined as the ability to cope with, listen to, emotional pain as a source of knowledge.

The best investigator and decision-maker, therefore, is someone who does not suppress their emotions (or try to suppress others emotions). The best investigator is someone who will allow their emotions to drive the search for a credible explanation and who will continue to listen to their emotions to seek out evidence of contraditions that need investigation and explanation.

Acknowledgement

I am grateful to my sister Jessica for writing to me about the training and treatment regime she has pioneered amongst aboriginal tribe members in Australia. The destruction of aboriginal culture, and group life, has resulted in high levels of alcoholism and drug addiction.

If using this article, please include the citation:

Based on Ridley-Duff, R. J. (2007) Emotion, Seduction and Intimacy: Alternative Perspectives on Organisation Behaviour, Bracknell: Men's Hour Books, pp. 29-34.

References

Asch, S. (1955) "Opinions and social pressure", Scientific American, 193(5): 31-35.

BBC News (2006) "Jenkins Cleared in Billie-Jo Case", 9th February 2006. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/4661252.stm for details.

Conlon, J. (1994) Proved Innocent: The Story of Gerry Conlon and the Guildford Four, Penguin Books Ltd.

Fineman, S. (ed) (2000) Emotion in Organizations, 2nd edn, Sage Publications.

Glass, L. (2002) I Know What You're Thinking, John Wiley & Sons.

Goffman, E. (1969) The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Milgram, S. (1963) "Behavioural study of obedience", Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67: 371-378.

Miller, G. (1962), Psychology: The Science of Mental Life, London: Penguin Books.

Plante, L. L. (1991) Prime Suspect, London, Granada Television Ltd. Originally shown on UK television, ITV1, 1st April, 1991.

Ridley-Duff, R. J. (2005) Communitarian Perspectives on Corporate Governance, Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam University

Sandelands, L., Boudens, C (2000) "Feeling at Work" in Fineman, S (ed) (2000) Emotion in Organizations, 2nd edn, Sage Publications, pp. 46-63.

Sutherland, S. (1992) Irrationality: The Enemy Within, London: Constable.

Weick, K. E. (1995) Sensemaking in Organizations, London: Sage.